Maritime cyber security

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2019 ReCAAP ISC Piracy and Sea Robbery Conference

Agenda

- The regulatory framework
- Shipping industry guidance
- Cyber incident examples from real life

Regulatory framework for cyber security

- Ambiguity from IMO:
  - "…recommend a risk management approach to cyber risks that is resilient and evolves as a natural extension of existing safety and security management practices."
  - "ENCOURAGES Administrations to ensure that cyber risks are appropriately addressed in safety management systems no later than the first annual verification of the company's Document of Compliance after 1 January 2021."

BIMCO, ICS and United States' approach

- Physical access to restricted areas should be managed under the ISPS Code (Ship Security Assessment and Ship Security Plan)
- Other cyber risks should be managed under the ISM Code in the Safety Management System

- This will facilitate
  - Up to date procedures,
  - Avoiding duplication,
  - Best possible level of cyber security,
  - Reduced cost to ship owners (avoiding frequent updates to SSP).

Industry guidance for cyber security on board ships

- Cyber security and safety management
- Threat identification
- Vulnerability identification
- Risk assessment
- Protection and detection measures
- Contingency plans
- How to respond and recover



Virus in ECDIS delays ship's departure

- Technical problem
- No paper charts on board
- Maker's technician called in
- Virus discovered, isolated and ECDIS computers restored
- Deleays cost hundreds of thousands USD

Crash of integrated navigation bridge

- Ship experienced failure of nearly all systems at sea, in dense traffic and reduced visibility
- Ship had to navigate for two days using paper chart and a stand-alone radar to reach port
- Maker’s technician had performed software updates of navigation software running on ship’s computer
- Outdated operatingn system was unable to run the updated software, and crashed

Worm attack on maritime IT and OT

- Onboard power management system connected to the internet
- Company IT department discovered a dormant worm that could have activated when ship was connected to the internet
- Worm believed to originate from maker’s service technician
- Worm spread via USB to all servers and associated equipment
- Worm was undiscovered for 875 days

Main application server infected by ransomware

- Ransomware infection on the main application server of a ship caused complete disruption of the IT infrastructure
- Ransomware encrypted all essential files and data was lost
- Poor password policy enabled attackers to log on via remote management services
- The undocumented user was deactivated and stronger password policy was introduced

Comments and questions