Removal of Indian Ocean HRA

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Nautical Forum 14/23 17 Jan 2023

LEADING THE WAY, MAKING A DIFFERENCE



INTERTANKO



Members lead the continuous improvement of the tanker industry's performance and strive to achieve the goals of:

ZERO fatalities
ZERO pollution
ZERO detentions

Deliver highest quality services to meet stakeholders' expectations

Promote availability and use of personnel with best marine skills and competencies



INTERTANKO Committees





Advisories & Best Practices

Regulatory and Member relevant issues addressed Focus on practical Member support





Indian Ocean

Removal of HRA

- 01 January 2023, 0001h UTC
- UKHO Chart Q6099 will be updated
- No successful attacks since 2013
- No attacks since 2016
- Reflect sentiment that free flow of commerce is reestablished in this region



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MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE 106th session Agenda item 7 MSC 106/INF.10
22 August 2022
ENGLISH ONLY

PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS

Removal of the Indian Ocean High Risk Area

Submitted by ICS, BIMCO, OCIMF, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO and IMCA

SUMMARY

Executive summary

Following the process described in document MSC 104/8/2 (ICS et al.) and the implementation of the new system for the provision of security advice by the industry, for the industry, the cosponsors give notice of removal of the Indian Ocean High Risk Area (HRA). The HRA will no longer be in place from 0001 UTC on 1 January 2023.



Removal of Indian Ocean HRA


Background

- Nov 2008 Pirates began attacking ships in Indian Ocean for ransom
- Main cause factors at that time:
 - total breakdown of law and order within Somalia following the collapse of the local government in 1991
 - Somalis then justified their action through the claim that their coastal waters created a haven for dumping industrial waste as well as IUU fishing causing many to turn to piracy for livelihood
- International Shipping Associations created HRA in Indian Ocean by 2010 to align the "how" and "where" to protect seafarers



Changing times, reflecting threat

2011



2015




Whole of Red Sea and most Indian Ocean HRA and VRA same




Changing times, reflecting threat

2016 reduction



2017 increased Yemen spillover





Some Factors Considered

- Economic development of maritime infrastructure in previous pirate strong holds that were in Somalia.
- Societal and economic drivers of piracy in Somalia have significantly diminished.
- Sustained sentiments within Somali clan structure deny the pirates access to anchorages where previously captured ships were held.
- Difficult for pirate action groups to raise the funding required to prepare and conduct attacks.
- Kenyan military deployments and law enforcement in and around Southern Somalia limit the opportunity and capability of pirates to operate
- Expect that clear indicators of any build-up would provide time to warn industry.



Removal of HRA


What will not change

- CMF naval missions & international naval presence continues
- Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) administered by UKMTO continues
- Ships entering the VRA encouraged to report to UKMTO and register with MSCHOA
- BMP 5 measures e.g. threat & risk assessment
- Seeking of advice on maritime security threats from variety of sources



UKMTO VRA

UKHO Chart Q6099 to be amended





UKMTO VRS Continues

- Voluntary Reporting Scheme (VRS) for the Indian Ocean, specifically Red Sea, Gulf Of Aden, and Arabian Sea,
- Administered by the Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC)/UKMTO
- UKMTO primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces in the region.
- Registration with UKMTO & MSCHOA establishes direct contact between the reporting ship and UKMTO.
 - email: <u>watchkeepers@ukmto.org</u> daily at 08.00 UTC) whilst operating in the area
 - MSCHOA registration on <u>www.mschoa.org</u>
- Report suspicious activity to the UKMTO as per Section 6 of the BMP5



Planning as Per BMP5

Ship Master Planning Prior to entering the Voluntary Reporting Area

- Obtain the latest threat information through company's regular review of threats & risk assessments & SSA/SSP updates
- Check the latest NAVAREA warnings and alerts.
- Implement VRA/MSCHOA vessel registration and reporting requirements in BMP5
- If PCASPs used, confirm PCASP embarkation plan.
- Confirm propulsion can operate at full speed.



"Mare Liberium III"

Combine Maritime Force (CMF) Focused operation

 Conducted by CTF 151 (currently led by the Brazilian Navy) from 05th to 09th Jan 2023

- © Gulf of Aden
- CTF 151 established in 2009 as a response to piracy attacks in Somalia
- Multinational effort with assets including vessels, aircrafts, unmanned elements, satellite systems
- Emphasis for Maritime Community to continue with BMP5 & use the IRTC



"Operation ATALANTA"

Mandate extended to 31 Dec 2024

- EU Council announced on 12 Dec 2022 that Operation ATALANTA continue military maritime operations in HOA & Somalia
- EU NAVFOR maintains roles to deter & suppress piracy at sea
- Supporting the progress of Somali Security Forces and Government
- Scope broadened to include:
 - UN arms embargo in Somalia
 - Reduce drug traffic
 - Support fight against Al Shabaab & funding streams
 - Freedom of navigation
 - Protection of World Food Programme & vulnerable shipping to Somalia



Dynamic Assessment of Threats

- Outdated to designate a high-risk area based solely on the threat from Somali piracy
- Other areas of more critical threats to merchant shipping such as the Gulf of Guinea, asymmetric warfare, non-state actors in the Bab al Mandeb, Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are greater than that of piracy.
- High Risk Area no longer reflects the severity of the threats in the region, and the disparity between this area and others in which the threat is critical
- Need for a more <u>dynamic threat assessment process</u>



Joint Industry Security Group (JISG)

- A representative security forum for the maritime industry, with the following roles:
 - To review wide-ranging security threats to seafarers.
 - To represent the interests of organisations members.
 - To promulgate where seafarers may face increased threat.
 - Ensure best possible advice is given to owners, operators, and seafarers.
- Group consists of representatives each from BIMCO, CLIA, ICS, IMCA, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, OCIMF and the WSC
- JISG bulletins, guidance or products will be placed on the industry website <u>www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org</u>



Joint Industry Security Group (JISG)

Maritime Security web site (<u>www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org</u>) maintained by:


 BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO, InterManager, P&I Clubs IG, INTERTANKO & OCIME

Aims to:

- provide dynamic assessment of the impact of threats,
- Recommend mitigations that could be put in place

Covers threats to mariners:

- Maritime Crime, including armed robbery, theft, and Kidnap for Ransom
- Piracy
- Cyber Threats including GPS spoofing, GPS denial and communications Interference
- State on State Conflicts and Insurgency





"Non-piracy- related" threats

M.T. "Herioc Indun"

- Nigeria Navy tried to inspect
- Confusion over the identity and ship fled
- Equatorial Guinea navy arrested ship & handed over to Nigeria
- Ship & Crew still being held since 09th Aug 2022

M.T. "Prudent Warrior"

- Held by the IRGC at Bandar Abbas since May 2022
- Tit-for-tat move, after Greece detained an Iranian-linked tanker under sanctions

Drones operating in the Gulf Area

- Attacks on ships
- Surveillance use by military

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